Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

(b)(1)
(b)(3)



CIA

TO: PRIORITY WHITE HOUSE, STATE RCI//INR/DSITA//,
SSO DIA//DHO-CSR//, JOINT STAFF, DA IDHS, ONI, CNO,
CMC//CIE/CIC/CIZ//, SSO USAF, SSO NAIC, SSO NGIC//HCS//,
SSO REDSTONE, MCIA QUANT, JWAC//J2//, DIRNSA,
FBI//ISD/NSD/OHLSON//, DOJ CMD CTR, DIRNACIC, SSO USEUCOM,
JAC MLSWTH, SY SEC SHAPE, SSO USAREUR//AEAGB-ISD//, SSO USAFE,
CINCUSNAVEUR, COMSIXFLT, SSO USTRANS, SSO CINCSOC//SOIO-IN-SSO//,
SSO JSOC//FT BRAGG NC//, USCINCJFCOM, JFIC,
CINCLANTFLT//NORFOLK VA//, COMMARFORLNT//NORFOLK VA//.

S E C R E T
SERIAL: PASS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM;
STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR AND AS/DS; DIA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA AND PASS NWS (DIRECTOR ONLY);
NMJIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE; DA:
EXCLUSIVE FOR DAMI; ONI: EXCLUSIVE FOR ONI-22; CNO: EXCLUSIVE FOR
N2 (CNO IP)/ONI-26; CMC: EXCLUSIVE FOR CIE; CSAF: EXCLUSIVE FOR
IN; NAIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SSO; NGIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SSO;
MSIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SSO; MCIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE SSO; JWAC:
EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE; NSA FOR ZKZK OO ZRL DE
(EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA); FBI: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION; JUSTICE: EXCLUSIVE
FOR THE COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE POLICY, OIPR; NACIC: EXCLUSIVE
FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER; EXCLUSIVE
FOR USCINCEUR; EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COMMANDER EUCOM JAC; US SURVEY
DIVISION SHAPE (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COMMANDER); EXCLUSIVE FOR
CINCUSAREUR; EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCUSAFE; EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCUSNAVEUR;
EXCLUSIVE FOR COMSIXTHFLT; EXCLUSIVE FOR USCINCTRANS; EXCLUSIVE
FOR USCINCSOC; EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COMMANDER JSOC; EXCLUSIVE FOR
USCINCJFCOM; EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COMMANDER JFIC; EXCLUSIVE FOR
CINCLANTFLT; EXCLUSIVE FOR COMMARFORLANT.

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-- (b)(3)

EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT

DIST: 5 MARCH 2001

COUNTRY: CONGO(K)/ZIMBABWE/ANGOLA

SUBJ: STATUS OF DROC COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

DOI: (b)(1) (b)(3)

SOURCE: (b)(1) (b)(3)

SUMMARY: NONE.

TEXT: 1. (b)(1) (b)(3)

2. (b)(1) (b)(3) ZIMBABWE WAS PLAYING THE MAJOR ROLE IN DIRECTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DROC) COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ASSASSINATION OF DECEASED DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA. A ZIMBABWEAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GENERAL WAS HEAD OF THE COMMISSION AND A NUMBER OF ZIMBABWEAN PERSONNEL HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO IT AS INVESTIGATORS. THE ZIMBABWEANS ON THE COMMISSION WERE BEHIND BOTH THE ORDERS TO ARREST CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES (FAC) GROUND FORCES COMMANDER COLONEL EDDY ((KAPEND)) ON 18 FEBRUARY 2001 AND ALSO THE SUBSEQUENT ACCUSATIONS INDICATING KAPEND WAS THE PRIME SUSPECT IN A PERCEIVED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE LAURENT KABILA. THE DATE FOR THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE COMMISSION'S INITIAL FINDINGS, OFFICIALLY SLATED TO BE ANNOUNCED ON 8 MARCH 2001, MAY BE POSTPONED.

3. (b)(1) (b)(3) THE COMMISSION HAD ORDERED KAPEND'S ARREST NOT ONLY DUE TO ITS SUSPICION OF HIS HAVING HAD A KEY ROLE IN THE ASSASSINATION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE HARARE SUSPECTED THAT KAPEND WAS INTENDING TO MOUNT A SIMILAR OPERATION TO REPLACE NEW DROC PRESIDENT JOSEPH ((KABILA)). THE ZIMBABWEANS BELIEVED THAT KAPEND WAS HIGHLY AMBITIOUS, DANGEROUS, AND CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A COUP DUE TO HIS DISLIKE FOR JOSEPH KABILA, HIS HAVING STOCKPILED WEAPONS AT THE MARBLE PALACE, AND HIS COMMAND OF THE LOYALTY OF MANY FAC TROOPS. COMMENT: (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3) KAPEND HAD GIVEN HIS TENTATIVE SUPPORT TO A PLOT BY FAC COMMANDANT CALVIN ((KANDOLO)) TO OVERTHROW THE REGIME OF JOSEPH ((KABILA)) IN LATE JANUARY 2001.)

4. (b)(1) (b)(3) THE COMMISSION WAS HOLDING KAPEND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ARRESTS AND SUBSEQUENT EXECUTIONS OF ELEVEN LEBANESE EXPATRIATES FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION. THE COMMISSION NOTED THAT THESE EXECUTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT NOTIFYING JOSEPH KABILA BEFOREHAND, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF A TRIAL, AND WITHOUT ANY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION.

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

THE COMMISSION BELIEVED THAT KAPEND HAD ORDERED THESE ARRESTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEFLECT ATTENTION AWAY FROM HIS OWN SUSPECTED ROLE IN LAURENT KABILA'S DEATH.

5. [redacted] THERE WAS SOME EVIDENCE INDICATING CONTACT BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASSASSINATION BETWEEN A U.S. OFFICIAL AND SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS PRESENTLY UNDER ARREST IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION, BUT HARARE BASICALLY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS BEHIND-THE-SCENES FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT. [redacted] SOME CONGOLESE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A U.S. OR BELGIAN HAND BEHIND THE DEATH OF FORMER PRESIDENT KABILA, ALTHOUGH THE ZIMBABWEANS WHO WERE DIRECTING THE COMMISSION WERE NOT INTERESTED AT PRESENT IN PURSUING THIS LINE OF INQUIRY. AS A RELATED MATTER, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FOR SECURITY NONO ((LUTULA)) WAS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY BY THE COMMISSION FOR WHAT WERE VIEWED AS HIS RECKLESS STATEMENTS ALLEGING THE INVOLVEMENT OF AN UNNAMED FOREIGN HAND IN THE ASSASSINATION. [redacted] COMMENT: [redacted] [redacted] LUTULA WAS UNDER ARREST AT THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION; HE WAS BEING QUESTIONED ON HIS ACTIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASSASSINATION.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

6. REGARDING WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED DURING THE SHOOTING OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT, ZIMBABWEAN INVESTIGATORS BELIEVED THAT RASHID ((KASEREKA)), THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALLY IDENTIFIED AS THE ASSASSIN, HAD IN FACT NOT KILLED THE PRESIDENT. THE KILLING WAS PURPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT BY TWO UNNAMED INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE SAID TO BE STILL AT LARGE (NFI). KABILA WAS SHOT FIVE TIMES--FIRST THROUGH THE NECK, SUBSEQUENTLY TWICE IN THE LEG AS HE ROSE TO FLEE AND THEN FINALLY WAS FINISHED OFF WITH TWO BULLETS IN HIS TORSO. THE ASSASSINS THEN KILLED KASEREKA, WHO HAD WITNESSED THE SHOOTING.

7. AS OF LATE FEBRUARY 2001 ANGOLA HAD AGREED TO ALLOW ZIMBABWE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DIRECTING THE INVESTIGATION, PURPORTEDLY BECAUSE OF ZIMBABWE'S MUCH HEAVIER ENGAGEMENT IN THE DROC. THERE WERE TWO ANGOLAN MEMBERS ON THE COMMISSION. [redacted] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH KAPEND WAS AN ANGOLAN FAVORITE TO ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY FOLLOWING LAURENT KABILA'S DEATH, LUANDA HAS NOT INDICATED THAT IT IS DISTRESSED AT KAPEND'S RECENT ARREST.)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

8. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

9. [redacted] THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION WAS EXPECTING TO SUBMIT ITS REPORT TO NEW DROC PRESIDENT JOSEPH ((KABILA)) AS SCHEDULED 8 MARCH. ONCE THE DROC PRESIDENT RECEIVED THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION, HE WOULD DECIDE WHAT, IF ANY, FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE REQUIRED, AND WHAT ANNOUNCEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE ABOUT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE INVESTIGATION. THE ZIMBABWEAN HEADING THE DROC MIXED COMMISSION WAS GENERAL (FNU) ((CHEDONDO)), THE CHIEF OF THE EXTERNAL DEPARTMENT OF ZIMBABWEAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

POC: [redacted] (b)(3)
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
ACQ: [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

DISSEM: [redacted] SENT TO BRUSSELS, DAR ES SALAAM, GENEVA, HARARE, (b)(1) (b)(3)
KAMPALA, KIGALI, KINSHASA, LONDON, LUANDA, LUSAKA, NAIROBI,
OTTAWA, PARIS, PRETORIA, ROME; (PRINCIPAL OFFICERS ONLY), USUN
(AMBASSADORS ONLY), US SURVEY DIVISION SHAPE (EXCLUSIVE FOR THE
COMMANDER), EXCLUSIVE FOR USCINCEUR, EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COMMANDER
EUCOM JAC, EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCUSAREUR, EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCUSAFE,
EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCUSNAVEUR, EXCLUSIVE FOR COMSIXTHFLT, EXCLUSIVE
FOR USCINCSOC, EXCLUSIVE FOR JSOC, EXCLUSIVE FOR USCINCTRANS,
EXCLUSIVE FOR USCINCJFCOM, EXCLUSIVE FOR JFIC, EXCLUSIVE FOR
CINCLANTFLT, EXCLUSIVE FOR COMMARFORLANT.

WASHINGTON DISSEM:

TO WHSITRM: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO STATE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR AND AS/DS

TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA

TO NMJIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

TO ARMY: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

TO NAVY: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

TO MARINE CORPS: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

TO AIR FORCE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, ISR

TO JWAC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NSA

TO FBI: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION

TO JUSTICE: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE COUNSEL FOR INTELLIGENCE POLICY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW

TO NACIC: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER

WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-- [redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] (b)(3)

[redacted] ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057

END OF MESSAGE SECRET.
CABLETYPE:
RELNO:
ORIG:
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2017/09/13 C06692057